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The Internet and information systems have enabled businesses to reduce costs, attain 
greater market reach, and develop closer business partnerships along with improved 
customer relationships.  However, using the Internet has led to new risks and concerns.  
This research provides a management perspective on the issues confronting CIOs and IT 
managers.  It outlines the current state of the art of information security, the important 
issues confronting managers, security enforcement measure/techniques, and potential 
threats and attacks.  It develops a model for classification of threats and control measures.  
It also develops a scheme for probabilistic evaluation of the impact of security threats 
with some illustrative examples.  It involves validation of information assets and 
probabilities of success of attacks on those assets in organizations and evaluates the 
expected damages of these attacks.  The research outlines some suggested control 
measures and presents some cost models for quantifying damages from these attacks and 
compares the tangible and intangible costs of these attacks.  This research also develops a 
risk management system for information systems security incidents in five stages: 1- 
Resource and application value analysis, 2- Vulnerability and risk analysis, 3-
Computation of losses due to threats and benefits of control measures, 4- Selection of 
control measures, and 5- Implementation of alternatives.  The outcome of this research 
should help decision makers to select the appropriate control measure(s) to minimize 
damage or loss due to security incidents.  Finally, some recommendations for future work 






Overview of Research 
 
The exponential growth of internet-based commerce is threatened by legitimate concerns 
over the security of a system that has a large number of potentially vulnerable 
components.  Despite the potential rewards of conducting business on the Internet, some 
corporations have been slow to embrace this technology.  Perhaps the most important 
reason for both businesses and consumers to refrain from establishing and participating in 
electronic commerce (e-commerce) is the potential for loss of assets and privacy due to 
possible security breaches in such systems.  For example, a single, highly-publicized 
security breach can erode confidence in the business and not only damage the reputation 
of the firm, but can cause widespread repercussions in the e-commerce industry.  
Chapter two of this dissertation provides a perspective of today’s business and 
information security and explains: 
• The state of the art of security practice in businesses 
• The nature of security threats, how to deploy information security programs that 
thwart those threats, and 
• The need for continually supervising the performance of information security 
managers to assure that they are properly maintaining and upgrading their 
systems. 
Chapter 3 discusses the author’s opinion about the cost of computer security incidents 
and explains: 
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• The cost of a computer security incident to an organization has to be measured in 
terms of the impact on their business. Hence, identical incidents occurring in two 
different companies of the same industry or other organizations, like government 
entities, could have different costs. 
• The process of quantifying these costs 
• Empirical analysis of the existing available literature, indicating that the greatest 
amount of damage in terms of the financial/market evaluation of companies is 
caused by the violation of data confidentiality, and   
• Incidents such as intrusion, when confidentiality of data is not compromised, 
typically results in direct damage such as denial of service.  The cost of this kind 
of attack is directly quantifiable, but it is not as costly and as hard to quantify as 
the damage caused by the potential loss or disclosure of confidential information 
from other attacks. 
Lack of statistics from past information security incidents, makes the probability 
assessment of upcoming attacks a very complicated task.  Chapter four discusses:  
• Subjective probability assessment as a possible solution for estimating the 
likelihood of an event  
• Some of the shortcomings of this approach, and a scope for this assessment, and   
• A quantitative approach for estimating the probability of the information systems 
security incidents using specific examples.   
Regardless of all the existing countermeasures, statistics show that chances of 
computer security system failure are still very high.  The Internet Fraud Complaint 
Center, IFCC (a partnership of the National White Collar Crime Center and the Federal 
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Bureau of Investigation) reports that there were16,775 complaints of fraud for the Jan. 1, 
2001- Dec. 31, 2001 period.  These frauds have caused serious tangible and intangible 
losses to the companies and e-commerce industry as a whole and are on the rise.  The 
Center for Emergency Response Team, CERT, at the Carnegie Mellon University, 
reported that they have received 2,437 vulnerability reports in 2001 compared with 3,784 
vulnerability reports in 2003.  In 2001, they handled 52,658 computer security incidents 
compared with 137,529 in 2003.  Chapter five includes: 
• A literature review on existing classifications of threats and countermeasures 
• Threats are broken down into two components: 1- Threat agent, and 
2- Penetration technique.  A security breach is caused by a threat agent using a 
specific penetration technique to produce an undesired effect on the network. 
• Threat agents are classified into environmental factors, authorized users, and 
unauthorized users, and  
• Techniques are classified into physical, personnel, hardware, software, and 
procedural. 
This research has developed a five-stage risk management system to identify, 
analyze and respond to information systems security incidents.  This risk management 
system, which is explained in chapter six, includes: 
• Resource and application value analysis  
 Determine the sensitivity of information 
 Estimate asset values 
• Vulnerability and risk analysis 
 Identify vulnerabilities 
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 Weigh vulnerabilities 
 Assess threat probabilities  
• Computation of losses due to threats and benefits of control measures 
 Review risk 
 Identify control measures 
 Assess changes in threat probabilities 
• Selection of control measures  
 Enumerate search procedure  
 Use mathematical  programming approaches 
• Implementation of alternatives   
 Develop and approve a plan 
 Implement control measures 
 Test and evaluate 
A quantitative method for selecting control measure is also discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter seven of this research explains the case studies:  
• Evaluating the accuracy of findings from the literature review  
• Analysis of the source, classification, and importance of threats to information 
systems, and  
• Assigning effective control measures to confront these threats which were 
evaluated by experts   
The methodology included meetings, telephone conversations and e-mails with 
company executives and government officers. 
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 Chapter eight classifies the contributions of this research to the information 
security industry: 
• Defining a minimal set of elements to be considered in an effective information 
security program  
• Comparison of intangible and tangible cost of information security incidents  
• Adaptation of subjective probability assessment to empirical data and applying it 
to information security 
• Classification of threats and control measures to information systems, and  
• Developing a five-stage risk management system. 
Broader impacts of this research in solving technical and business issues of information 
security have also been discussed in Chapter 8.   
Finally, Chapter nine proposes some approaches for tradeoff analysis between the 
cost of security measures, versus incident rate/reliability/safety measures.  Chapter nine 












Information Security: Practice and Threats in Organizations 
 
Federal Standard 1037C (1997) [27] defines information security as: “The protection of 
information against unauthorized disclosure, transfer, modification, or destruction 
whether accidental or intentional”. 
Information security is an area in which interest is mounting rapidly.  It is 
becoming widely recognized that security is a fundamental aspect of any information 
system and warrants high attention beginning with system design and continuing 
throughout the product lifecycle.  Failure to properly address security requirements leads 
not only to operational risks but also to prospects of outright product rejection by 
customers.  Currently, organizations are struggling to understand what the threats to their 
information assets are and how to obtain the necessary resources to combat these threats.  
Acquiring the appropriate human and financial resources to offset the growing threats to 
information security continues to pose a challenge to many organizations.   Information 
security includes many subjects, from high level principles and policy right down to the 
very detailed calculations in encryption algorithms.   
Chapter two discusses the current state of the art in business information security 
practice.  This is followed by a discussion on the nature of security threats and deploying 
resources in information security by business managers. 
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2.1 The State of the Art of Security Practice in Businesses 
The vast majority of businesses deploy their information security programs in a 
piecemeal and poorly integrated fashion.  In an ideal state, the security governance 
function is managed by a senior executive who reports on the overall state of the 
information security program to a committee of the senior leadership team.  Once that 
program is established, the noteworthy elements of this report will be exceptions and 
upcoming changes to the initial report. The information security policy will be brief but 
comprehensive; not mixing procedural details or instructions for specialists with the 
general guidelines, goals, and expectations outlined for users. The information security 
architecture will translate policy directives (“we will keep customer information private”) 
into detailed platform-neutral directives (“users must authenticate themselves with a 
unique password that is changed at least every 90 days”).  
Most organizations are running some form of “awareness program” to enable 
employees to become aware of the organizational security policies. The awareness 
program includes an introductory module for new hires covering the information security 
program as well as details on how to recognize and report a problem. Employees and 
contractors are given a second module covering updates to the information security 
program upon taking a new assignment, or after there are substantial changes in the 
environment. Every employee attends an update seminar of a few hours annually.  
Information security products and tools are acquired through a formal Request for 
Proposal (RFP) process that is governed by an ongoing gap analysis assessing the 
variance between policy requirements and platform capabilities. Such tools are only 
deployed after a policy statement governing their use and goals is developed by the chief 
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information security officer, who also owns responsibility for the architecture. When an 
information security event is suspected, a cyber emergency response team (typically a 
virtual team made up of a few specialists in key IT areas) acts quickly to review logs, 
configuration information, and assess damage. Normal requests for access (new, changed, 
or deleted) are processed through an automated provisioning system. Password change 
requests are handled by self-service capabilities. Finally, as part of an annual audit, the 
entire information security program is revalidated against changes in the technology, 
marketplace, risk profile, work force demographics, and business structure.  
Businesses typically deploy a subset of the elements of an effective enterprise-
wide information security program. Large, publicly traded firms recognize some 
obligation to their investors and recognize the potential for: 1) Damage to their brand and 
reputation, 2) Legal and regulatory risk, and 3) Adverse financial consequences from an 
information security breach.  The next tier of firms tends to be much less coordinated and 
much more informed with respect to their information security programs, relying on the 
talents of one or two information technology specialists who use their experience and 
contacts to deploy what, in their individual opinion, constitutes an appropriate set of 
control measures. The vast majority of smaller firms may do little or nothing to preserve 
or protect their IT environment. Spending on information security, not including disaster 
recovery, typically amounts to less than three percent of the IT budget, according to 
statistics developed by The Gartner Group. Those elements of the information security 
program that are deployed, find their funding justified only in response to a specific crisis 
such as: antivirus in response to a virus incident or firewalls in response to an internet 
deployment issue. An awareness and training program may feature one anecdote 
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concerning a recent problem that was dealt with after the fact rather than with a 
coordination policy devised before the problem occurred.  As a result, there were no 
lessons learned to enrich the corporate culture. For the majority of businesses, there may 
be no awareness of the scope of the vulnerabilities they face, and often there may be no 
awareness of security breaches as they occur.  
From business schools, professional managers learn what ought to be done to 
mitigate the risks of an information security breach, just as learning how to structure clear 
and effective management processes. However in the rough and tumble reality of day-to-
day business, these lessons often get lost. It consumes resources to fully document 
procedures, review apparently completed work, deploy additional security measures, 
reset adequate default passwords, remove unused system ids, or apply patches to 
problems that have not been actually experienced.  
Too often businesses focus on near-term tactical issues and ignore the strategic 
implications of such decisions. When a dominant firm in a particular geographic region 
or industry deploys an effective and integrated information security program, thereby 
lowering costs, reducing occurrences of unplanned outages, and enhancing brand and 
image, some competitors begin to see how such benefits could be theirs as well.  
Similarly, businesses understand that clearly documented processes allow for 
improvement in auditing, and training; but the reality is that few businesses actually 
document even their core procedures very well. Most managers understand that wasted 
time, effort, resources and product is costly; yet few are willing to invest the effort to 
perform a comprehensive survey of their processes to analyze and eliminate waste, 
redundancy, and delay. During the 1960s, American industry embraced the notion of 
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quality as a separate and distinct initiative. Major manufacturing firms designated senior 
managers as “Directors of Quality” and charged them with reducing product defects. 
These unfortunate individuals were totally ineffective because they lacked the 
organizational clout to modify existing business processes. The standard process of 
design, development, manufacturing and field maintenance continued unchanged. The 
finding from these failed initiatives was that quality is not an independent variable in the 
manufacturing process.  
Eventually, we learned that quality is an aspect of the product development life-
cycle. In other words, the quality of a manufactured object is an intrinsic element of the 
method of the object’s manufacture. Quality is not like paint; it cannot be added on after 
the object is finished. Similarly, we are beginning to learn that information security is not 
a separate discipline from information technology. Information security is an aspect of 
how information technology is specified, designed, developed, deployed, and maintained. 
A comprehensive information security program has to be deeply integrated with the 
system throughout its lifecycle. The information security characteristics of an information 
technology environment are a consequence of its architecture, design, development, 
deployment, operations, and maintenance. Information security cannot be added on after 
an information technology environment is deployed. Information security is not a 
property of a product; it is a property of an environment.  
 
2.2 The Nature of Security Threats 
One useful model of the information security problem is to define three classes of 
objects. First, firms have intellectual property that represents value and therefore brings 
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risk of several forms to the firm. Second, that intellectual property is embodied in a 
technology environment that is imperfect which exhibits design flaws, trade-offs, defects 
and obscure documentation. Third, there is an individual, inside or outside the firm; who 
for some reason or another, wishes to exploit those technological or procedural 
weaknesses with the goal of damaging or transferring the value of that intellectual 
property.  What kinds of individuals might do this? At a high level, there are two traits of 
some relevance.  
First, the level of technical skill of the attacker, and second, the level of insider 
knowledge the attacker might have. An unskilled outsider may represent a low-grade 
threat; someone who might steal a laptop opportunistically and sell it.   An unskilled 
insider actually represents a fairly significant threat. Because by knowing the procedures; 
such a person can exploit weaknesses in the design of a system without having to modify 
sophisticated algorithms.    
Skilled outsiders (quadrant 1 in Figure 1) are the notorious hackers; of which 
there are only a few hundred in the world. However these individuals develop toolkits so 
hundreds of thousands of less skilled users can leverage the skill of the hacker to attack a 
broader range of sites. These individuals are dangerous, but until now most of their 
activities have been unguided. However, there is reason to believe that malevolent 
organizations are making contact with hacker groups to cultivate relationships. It is easy 
to believe that hackers are more likely to attack someone else; in fact, attacks are 
generally random and the technically skilled insiders (quadrant 2 in Figure 1) represent 
the most dangerous threat.  However, they are rarely caught and represent a very small 
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population. Procedural remedies; surveillance, audit, job rotation and so forth; allow the 
firm to minimize it’s exposure to this particular problem.  
This could be shown graphically as a two × two matrix with skill level as the 
vertical axis, and inside knowledge as the horizontal axis shown in Figure 1.  Quadrants 
three and four refer to low-skilled insiders and outsiders who are typically not involved in 









Figure 1- Skill Level- Insider Knowledge Matrix 
 
In general, insiders (in quadrant two) are responsible for most financially 
significant information security problems.  Federal Bureau of Investigation/Computer 
Security Institute, FBI/CSI, 2002 report which indicates that 78% of respondents to the 
survey have reported insider abuse of net access [54].  Therefore, firms must 
acknowledge that people with inside knowledge are a significant source of attacks, and 











2.3 Deploying Resources in Information Security 
Unfortunately, most firms do not have a transparent, repeatable process for determining 
when or how to deploy resources (money, staff, and time). At the senior management 
level, information security is often perceived as simply another of the systems 
management disciplines, requiring either a code patch or a software tool to fix the 
underlying problem.  
Such piecemeal approaches fail because they usually are driven by the haphazard 
occurrence, the most recent event, or the most recently publicized threat. A series of 
uncoordinated activities focused on fixing discrete problems alone, will leave gaps that 
will be exploited easily.  Some larger organizations that have more experience with 
information security have chosen to deploy a comprehensive information security 
program.  While there is no generally accepted model for such an initiative, the common 
elements are: 
 Governance – Translating business value and mission statements into principles 
relevant to information security 
 Policy – A clear, direct, concise high level statement of desired behavior and 
expected controls for users of an IT environment 
 Architecture – Translates the policy directives into platform neutral, low level 
actions (such as the ISO 7498-2 security functions) 
 Awareness and Training – Insuring that the staff are aware of management’s 
expectations and procedures to follow 
 Technology – Selection, deployment, operation and continuing evaluation of tools 
to amplify the directives in the policy 
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 Auditing, reporting and monitoring – Detection through an ongoing examination 
of the output from tools and processes for forensic and analytical purposes 
 Validation – As the environment changes, the prior steps are adjusted to maintain 
their relevance and effectiveness 
Deciding how much to spend on an information security program should be 
driven by the magnitude of the risk the firm acknowledges.  If the firm has developed 
some sense of the value of its intellectual property, then spending can be governed by 
attempting to mitigate the largest realistic risks first. While piecemeal approaches will 
always fail, approaches governed by both a comprehensive model like this (or the Control 
Objectives for Information and related Technology, COBIT, model, or the principles 
included in ISO 17799/BS 7799) as well as a sense of the magnitude of the risk the firm 
faces will make strategic sense over time.  
Firms rarely overspend on information security. One approach, used by a few 
large financial institutions, is to marry the Software Engineering Institute's Capability 
Maturity Model, SEI CMM, with the processes outlined in the COBIT model, and assess 
the relative maturity of the organizational processes. This is described in the ISACA 
(Information Systems Audit and Control Association) web site http://www.isaca.org. The 
purpose is to develop a gap analysis that can help guide resource commitment, not by 
attempting to identify the most likely expensive risk (and address that), but by 





2.4 Security Standards and Overview of Common Criteria 
Security standards ensure that individuals operate consistently to minimize risk and to 
make administration of systems and networks more efficient [66].  Standards can set a 
level of expectation that must be reached or exceeded in order to fulfill one’s obligation 
or responsibilities.  Standards can also have a large impact on implementation of security 
technologies.   When standards have not been taken into consideration related to 
technology implementations, they may impact the amount of energy or support required 
to meet the security objectives of an organization and consequently have an impact on 
both cost and the amount of risk. 
 A literature review has identified the following organizations and groups which 
have contributed in developing standards for information security: 
BSI: British Standards Institute 
CERT: Computer Emergency Response Team 
CSTC: Computer Security Technology Center 
EDPAA: Electronic Data Processing Auditors Association 
FACCI: Florida Association of Computer Crime Investigation 
FIRST: Forum of Incident Response Teams 
GASSP: Generally Accepted Systems Security Principles Subcommittee 
HERT: Hacker Emergency Response Team 
ICAT: Initiatives for Computer Authentication Technology 
ICSA: International Computer Security Association 
ISO: International Organization for Standardization 
NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology 
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NSA: National Security Agency 
Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center 
International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium 
Network Security International Association 
San Diego Regional Info Watch 
The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, usually 
referred to as “CC”, was initially developed in 1993 as an international standard to 
support developers, evaluators, and consumers of security products.  The part of an IT 
system or product which should be evaluated, based on the CC, is called the Target of 
Evaluation (TOE) and has to fulfill different security requirements which are verified by 
an evaluation authority [68].  
 The security requirements of the CC are divided into security functional 
requirements (requirements on the product) and security assurance requirements 
(requirements on the process) and are structured into classes, which are described in the 
following section. All the members of a class share a common focus, while differing in 
coverage of security objectives.  The functional requirements are realized in the functions 
of the system in order to achieve the security objectives of the TOE. The assurance 
requirements contain measures to be undertaken during development in order to keep the 
risk for weak points low.  They are necessary for guaranteeing the confidence that the 
TOE meets its security objectives.  The number and strictness of the assurance 
requirements to be fulfilled depends on the Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) one has 
chosen for the TOE. 
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The following contains measures and products independent of a chosen EAL 
which are important for a development based on the CC. The listed products belong to 
the different assurance classes of the CC: 
Security Target (class ASE) 
The Security Target (ST) is the core document of system development based on the CC. 
It contains the security analysis for the TOE.  First, the developers have to describe the 
TOE and its boundaries briefly in the ST.  Additionally, they have to define the assets of 
the TOE and the threats against the assets. The ST also must contain the security 
objectives corresponding to the threats. In order to protect the assets, counter the threats 
and ensure the security objectives, the developers have to define control measures. These 
control measures are specified by the security technical requirements and the assurance 
requirements of a TOE.  The functional requirements are chosen from the second part of 
the CC or are defined conformable to the CC. The assurance requirements result from the 
determined EAL. The ST is concluded with a TOE summary specification, describing the 
security functions of the TOE.  
Configuration  Management Plan (class ACM) 
All assurance requirements concerning the configuration management should ensure that 
the integrity of the TOE is preserved. Developers have to write a configuration 
management plan that contains a description of the configuration management system 





Design and Representation (class ADV) 
The assurance requirements about design and representation require correct and 
consistent specifications and designs on different levels of abstraction and formality (e.g., 
a semiformally specified high-level design). 
Life Cycle Documentation (class ALC) 
The assurance requirements for the life cycle support are important for the controlling of 
the development and maintenance of the TOE. For example, in this class there are 
requirements on the documentation of development tool usage. 
Test Documentation (class ATE) 
In this class all assurance requirements belong to test activities like test documentation, 
test depth and extent of testing. Test activities are used to validate that the TOE satisfies 
all security functional requirements defined in the ST. 
Vulnerability Assessment (class AVA) 
Activities concerning this class correspond to an analysis of the vulnerabilities (design-
specific weaknesses) of a system. 
Guidance Documents (class AGD) 
The CC contains assurance requirements which refer to the content of the user and 
administration guidance.  Both documents have to be understandable, consistent and 
complete.  The aim is to show users and administrators how to operate with the system 
and its security functions in a secure manner. 
Delivery and Operation Documentations (class ADO) 
The CC contains assurance requirements to ensure the security during delivery, 
installation, start-up and operational use of the TOE. 
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The major strength of the CC Process is that it offers a common IT security 
language and attempts to measure both process and result.  This also makes it a good 
candidate for predevelopment of certification and accreditation.  However, there are 
several obstacles to the CC paradigm’s long-term survival. 
A lack of widespread government and commercial-sector use of CC evaluated 
products can be mentioned as an example.  Literature review indicates that even among 
informed and concerned communities, many users do not care about evaluations; others, 
want a mark of approval but do not really care what the mark represents [35].  Another 
significant obstacle is the concern about the comparability and competency of 
evaluations.  Conflicts between international harmonization and national investments 
could be especially significant if major European nations and the United States continue 
to follow increasingly divergent paths as they pursue the founding member nations who 
were able to work through their differences to produce the CC and the CC Recognition 












Costs Resulting from Information Security Incidents 
 
3.1 A critical overview 
A physical breach of security involves actual damage to, or loss of the computer 
hardware or media on which data are stored.  A logical breach affects the data and 
software without physically affecting the hardware.  Literature review reveals a stream of 
research on the cost of information systems security incidents [2, 8, 17, 20, 50, 65].  One 
of the problems with any logical breach of security is that the damage is invisible and its 
extent is unknown.  This causes serious difficulties for managers to justify their 
investments on security.  A simple approach for finding return on investment is 
calculating:  
[(Change in revenue) + Cost saving)] / [(Investment)]   
However, these parameters are hard to determine.  Decisions about return on security 
investment will not start to make sense until one can replace these parameters with 
numbers.  Literature review has also revealed that, by theoretical means, one can 
demonstrate that optimal level of investment in security-related activities should not 
exceed approximately one third of the potential expected loss [32].   
It is also argued, that a cost effective analysis is the preferred alternative when 
costs and benefits are not commensurate [30, 49, 50].  Effectiveness is more tractable 
because it does not ask the price of events.  Instead, it asks, “What is the most one can get 
for $X, given that he is inevitably going to spend $X?”  In other words, it is about 
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maximizing the effectiveness of an expense in pursuit of a benefit not easily valued.  
Some factors which are considered in this approach are: 
• Value linking- It is used to evaluate the combined effects of improving 
performance of a function and any consequential affect which results from 
a separate function. 
• Value restructuring- It addresses the values associated with restructuring a 
job of a department function (it measures the value of productivity 
increases resulting from organizational changes) 
• Innovation- It creates new functions within the business domain. 
Although this approach is not the solution to analysis of investment on security 
and a replacement for traditional cost benefit approach, it directs security mangers in the 
right directions.  
It has been suggested that a composite cost/benefit/risk methodology is 
appropriate for managers in their financial decision making [46].  To calculate Risk Score 
by this approach, one should multiply: 
Consequences: Most probable result of the potential threat, 
Exposure: The frequency of occurrence of the threat, and  
Probability: Likelihood that threat sequence will follow to completion 
Another factor to be calculated is the Prevention Score, which is the product of: 
Cost Factor (The cost factor of proposed control measures; a number between1-10), and 
Degree of Correction (The Degree of Correction that the proposed control measure 
provides for that threat).  By dividing Risk Score into Prevention Score, one can calculate 
the Justification Rating.   This Rating can be used as an index for managers in allocating 
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budgets to security threats.  For example, a Justification Rating greater than 200  requires 
immediate correction; 100-200 requires attention as soon as possible, and less than 100 
means that the threat should be eliminated, but situation is not an emergency.  
 The literature review also reveals a school of thought that promises economic 
reasoning as a solution to security issues of information systems [5, 55].  For example, 
the success of firewalls is not because of their effectiveness, but because auditors started 
demanding firewalls, and this fact could change the cost equations for businesses. The 
cost of adding a firewall incurred expense and user annoyance, but the cost of not having 
a firewall was failing an audit.  This theory explains that monetizing security can solve 
business and technical problems for the information security industry.  It provides 
information about both losses and product effectiveness, which are the prerequisites for 
the formation of a viable security market. 
 
3.2 Insurance & Risk Mitigation 
About 85 percent of the U.S. information infrastructure is controlled by the private sector.  
The private sector is highly influenced by the insurance industry, which plays a major 
role in decisions made by executives in the private sector.  This research also considers 
the potential impact of insurance on decisions which managers make about information 
security incidents.  Literature review reveals some attempts in identifying the role of the 
insurance industry in internet security [33, 56, 64].   
Insurance companies claim that their coverage includes: 1- Web content liability, 
2- Professional liability, 3- Network security third party liability, 4-
Intangible/information property loss, 5- Loss of revenue, and 6- Cyber extortion [28].  
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However, the insurance companies’ statements of paying claims for this coverage are 
questionable [33]. The insurance companies have also been questioned for their 
complicated policies [36].  The results of author’s interviews with law enforcement 
agencies and executives in private sector also confirm that the private sector is willing to 
work with the insurance industry in protecting its information assets.  However, 
ambiguity of policies and difficulties with pricing are a major burden to this partnership. 
This author argues that a trade-off exists between the amount a firm should invest 
to protect against possible security breaches and the amount it should spend on cyber-risk 
insurance.  For a given level of information value-vulnerability, higher levels of security 
protection will require lower levels of cyber-risk insurance and vice versa.  When 
allocating resources to lower the overall risk exposure to an acceptable level, the trade-off 
between investing to reduce the probability of security breaches and investing in 
insurance to reduce the financial losses (should breaches actually occur) should be 
viewed in cost-benefit terms. This cost-benefit tradeoff between reducing the risk of 
security breaches and buying insurance will also affect the level of residual risk (that is, 
the remaining risk after taking steps to protect and insure against security breaches) 
deemed to be an acceptable level. 
 
3.2.1 Liability Issues 
Avoidance of legal liability is cited as a reason for improving information security [58]. 
Organizations often find themselves in possession of confidential or proprietary 
information belonging to third parties with whom they have no formal agreement.  If that 
information should be somehow lost or stolen, thus causing injury to its original owner, 
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the organization may be liable. Under the strictures of tort law, the somewhat vague 
standard of the “reasonable man” is used to judge liability of negligence.  In United 
States vs. Carroll Towing Company, 1947, Judge Learned Hand [42] articulated a 
formula that has gone on to become one of the defining tests of negligence.   
Let: 
P = Probability of injurious event 
L = Gravity of the resulting injury 
B = Burden, or cost, of adequate precautions 
then, the accused party  is negligent if and only if B < PL 
The cost of avoiding an accident, and the expected cost of the accident, must be 
compared at the margin by measuring the costs and benefits of small increments in safety 
and stopping investing in more safety at the point where another dollar spent would yield 
a dollar or less in added safety.  Thus, the threat of legal liability creates an incentive for 
organizations to collect the necessary data to justify their information security policies 
with credible assessments of risk.  
 Competitive market forces are probably the last great engines of change that will 
force companies to protect their information assets efficiently. Regardless of the risk-
management strategy pursued, whether it is an annual loss expectancy assessment, 
scenario analysis, best practices, or some other strategy, the marketplace will ultimately 
govern whether that strategy was an efficient use of resources.  Those companies that 
secure their assets cost-effectively will gain a competitive advantage over those who do 
not. Thus, businesses that over-protect will have spent too much on security, and those 
that under-protect will suffer greater losses as a result of ensuing security breaches [53].   
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3.2.2 Information Systems Disasters  
An information system disaster can be defined as: “An event which causes the loss of the 
communication services, or of a significant part of it, or of systems, communications or 
applications for a length of time which prevents the impacted organization from 
achieving its mission or which imperils the business” [38].  The impact may be felt in a 
number of different ways: 
•  Existing customers may transfer business elsewhere, and prospects may not be 
converted into new customers.   
• New business is strangled; even loyal customers quickly become disaffected and 
hard-won market share drops.   
• The organization’s image and credibility may be damaged beyond recovery.   
• Cash flow goes into reverse as creditors seek immediate payment and debtors 
defer settling bills knowing that credit control systems are not available to purse 
them.   
• With the loss of production and financial control systems, costs run out of control.  
• Inventory costs mount and inventory management becomes erratic.   
• The share price may slump, reducing collateral and making the company 
susceptible to bank action such as withdrawing loans.   
According to the Gartner Group, two out of five companies that experience a catastrophe, 
or an extended system outage never resume operations; and of those that do, one-third go 
out of business within two years [21].     
 In the era of information systems and distributed computing, most businesses no 
longer  have the luxury of several days to fix a problem.  In fact, most critical 
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applications, like those used in e-commerce and customer service, usually require 
continuous availability or the recovery of data and critical applications in minutes and at 
worst, several hours.  Some organizations go so far as to stipulate that no transaction can 
be lost in the event of failure.   
These facts lead us to the conclusion that every company must be prepared for 
recovering from possible disasters.  The object of disaster recovery is not to eliminate 
risk, but to manage it.  A disaster recovery plan should comprise several elements: 
• Immediate reaction procedures 
• Restoration of the computing infrastructure 
• Restoration of the applications 
• Resumption of business processing under emergency arrangements 
• Restoration of the permanent computing service. 
It is also mentioned that the best planning looks to diversification as a strategy for 
protecting an organization even with a direct disaster hit [46].  Diversification does not 
mean creating back ups and hot sites, but creating an infrastructure for control and 
coordination.  This would enable all assets allocated to disaster recovery to be used all of 
the time and to be reallocated in the event of a disaster.   
 
3.2.3 Working with the Insurance Industry 
Traditionally, companies are willing to work with insurance companies to deal with risks 
of running their businesses.  The following are mentioned as the criteria of insurability of 
internet risks [34]: 
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• Fortuitousness.  This criterion demands that the event causing the case be 
unknown and not subject to influence at the time of conclusion of the contract.  
On the Internet, damages mainly result from deliberate attacks of third parties or 
technical defects.  However, the possibility of the intentional creation of a damage 
event by the insured to get insurance benefit may never be ruled out.  In order to 
eliminate the incentive for the insured to intentionally cause damage, or to neglect 
security measures, insurers apply specific obligations and components in the 
contract. 
• Unambiguousness.  This stipulates that the event (the damage occurrence) as well 
as the amount of damages be ratable in an objectively verifiable way.  In practice, 
the exact interpretation of occurrence of damage and the amount of damages that 
must be compensated by the insurance benefits require many insurance clauses.  
These clauses have to be agreed upon by the signatories before the conclusion of 
the insurance contract.   
• Estimability.  This criterion represents the problem of insufficient knowledge.  
For internet risks there is not enough statistical data upon which to base the 
decision to assess the damage. An insurer, who has to estimate the average 
amount of damages, as well as the probability of the occurrence of the event, will 
judge subjectively.  Likewise, the decision as to what extent a risk is basically 
insurable for the risk bearer will be subjective. 
• Independence.  This refers to positively correlated risks. These should be 
excluded so as to ensure a process of fortuity of the insured damage events of the 
business in force. Negatively correlated risks are preferable and therefore not 
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considered any further. Sufficient stochastic independence of the single risk is the 
central prerequisite for the effect of a collective portfolio balance.  If the majority 
of the insured suffered damages at the same time, then the individual cases no 
longer represent independent events.  Virus attacks, shortcomings or bugs of 
widely spread software can be cited as examples which cause highly correlated 
damages.  Denial of service attacks can also entail an accumulation of damages.  
Such accumulation of damage, endanger the solvency of the insurer, which means 
that high payments are due all of a sudden; far exceeding the individual capacity 
limit of the insurer. 
• Size.  The criterion of size refers to the highest possible risk of damage in an 
individual occurrence. The size of the risk to be insured is a criterion that can be 
quantified with great difficulty only. This is due to the fact that the insurability 
depends on the underwriting capacity of the insurance industry, or the 
underwriting policy of the insurer.  However, the maximum damage can always 
be restricted by limiting the coverage.  In addition, the insurer can extend the 
underwriting capacity by means of re-insurers.   
In response to Dr. Grzebiela’s concerns in working with insurance companies in 
dealing with risks of information systems security incidents, and in some cases disasters, 
this author identifies three approaches to be taken by managers [22]: 
1- Accepting the risk as a cost of doing business; some do and some do not.  For 
example, some companies accept the risk of someone eavesdropping on credit 
card transactions and they only provide encryption if the customers request it.   
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2- Transferring the risk entirely to an insurance company.  There are a large number 
of well-established insurance companies that insure internet risk, despite the 
mentioned difficulties: AIG, Cigma Property and Casualty, ICSA, J & H March, 
LIoyds, Reliance National/NRMS, Zurich Financial Services Group. 
3- Accepting some of the risk and transferring its proportionate cost to the cost of 
implementing control measures and expected cost of the incidents   
This research recommends the third approach as the most cost effective one in 
working with the insurance industry.  Implementing effective control measures not only 
reduces the probability of information systems incidents and possible disasters, but will 
have a tremendous impact on lowering the premiums and transferring the remaining risks 
to insurance companies.  In upcoming sections, this research provides some 
methodologies to assign probabilities of incidents, evaluating their costs and choosing 
cost-effective control measures in confronting these threats.   
 
3.2.4 Limiting Cases 
If the probability of the occurrence of an incident is considered as one out of one, 
meaning that a specific threat will definitely occur, then the benefit of a control measure 
will be reflected in its effectiveness in reducing the damage.  This approach is used in the 
risk management system presented later.  Another viewpoint is to define a shorter time 





3.3 Cost of an incident 
Dr. DeMillo and Dr. Dobkin explained that: “…The design of systems sufficiently secure 
with respect to such penetrators will perhaps never be achieved.  One can only hope that 
the cost of compromise [benefits of penetration vs. cost of protection] will increase to 
exceed the possible benefits that could be derived from such a compromise [18]”. 
Every company, no matter what size, must be able to understand the financial 
costs involved when its security is breached.  But what is a loss?  Cohen [16] states that: 
“A complete list of things that can go wrong with information systems is impossible to 
create.  People have tried to create comprehensive lists, and in some cases have produced 
encyclopedic volumes on the subject, but there are potentially infinite numbers of 
different problems that can be encountered, so any list can only serve a limited purpose”. 
The cost of a computer security incident to an organization has to be measured in 
terms of the impact on the business; hence identical incidents in two different 
organizations of the same industry or business type could have different costs.  The 
impact may well be financial, in forms of immediate costs and losses as was briefly 
explained before, but much more serious are the hidden costs.  For example, a computer 
security incident might damage an organization in terms of the following intangibles: 
• The brand image, public reputation and goodwill in the market place 
• The financial value of business transactions 
• Public and customer confidence in the accuracy of business transactions 
• Public and customer confidence in the fraud-resistance of business transactions 
• The ability to maintain revenue cash flow in a timely manner 
• The ability to resolve disputes beyond reasonable doubt 
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• The ability to meet the requirements of regulators 
In this section, we discuss how identical incidents can have different impacts on 
different companies; an approach for quantifying costs of incidents, and; the importance 
of intangible damages that can be caused by an incident. 
 
3.4 Variability of Losses Resulting from Similar Exploitation 
When a firm experiences an information security problem, the consequences to the firm 
can vary dramatically from instance to instance.  When two firms experience the same 
incident, one may be able to contain the damage, while the other may not. One may have 
effective backup procedures allowing the evidence to be used for a prosecution, while the 
other may face a difficult choice between resuming operations (by refreshing the 
environment) or supporting an investigation (by allowing systems to be sequestered, 
check-pointed, and analyzed). One firm may have an effective liaison with its 
information security vendors and outsourcers, while the other may not.  One may have 
properly tuned intrusion detection tools and able staff, while the other may not.  One may 
have rigorous screening of candidates for key positions, while the other may not. One 
may have an effective awareness program, while the other may not. One may truly 
support the culture of security, while the other may only provide occasional support, but 
no enduring commitment.  
Even with similar overall structures, firms never have similar configurations at the 
detailed, operational level. As a result, an incident may barely impact one firm while 
another similar firm may be overwhelmed with consequential damage.  This happens 
often when firms experience a virus attack. Seemingly minor configuration differences 
 32
may allow a particular virus to spread rapidly in one firm, while a similar firm notes the 
event but does not suffer greatly from it.  
Following a privacy violation, one firm might face vigorous prosecution from 
authorities in one jurisdiction, while a similar firm in another jurisdiction might not face 
any investigation at all.  
The simple fact is that the consequences from an information security breach are 
contingent on a vast number of factors, many of which are not under the control of the 
firm experiencing the breach.  
  
3.5 Quantifying the Cost of Security Incidents 
Before quantifying the damage that can be caused by an incident, managers should know 
the value of the assets of the organization that are exposed to the threat.  Logical and 
physical assets can be grouped into the following categories: 
1- Information − documented (paper or electronic) data or intellectual property used 
to meet the mission of an organization. 
2- Software − Software applications and services that process, store, or transmit 
information.  
3- Hardware − Physical devices for computing, communications and storage 
4- People − The people in an organization who posses skills, knowledge, and 
experience who are difficult to replace. 
5- Systems − Information systems that process and store information (systems being 
a combination of information, software, and hardware assets, and any host, client, 
or server being considered a system). 
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For example, the cost of downtime per hour caused by a denial of service attack can 
be computed by measuring the loss in the following categories:  
• Productivity  
(Number of employees impacted) × (Hours out) × (Burdened hourly rate) 
•  Revenue 
Direct loss, lost future revenues 
• Financial Performance 
Credit rating, stock price 
• Damaged Reputation 
Customers, suppliers, financial markets, banks, business partners, etc 
• Other Expenses 
Equipment rental, overtime costs, extra shipping costs, travel expenses, etc. 
This author, with the assistance of his colleagues at the Georgia State University, has 
also reviewed the cybercrime cases through Westlaw.  Westlaw is West’s online legal 
research service.  It provides quick, easy access to West’s vast collection of statutes, case 
law materials, public records, and other legal resources, along with current news articles 
and business information.  The following searches found the most useful cases for this 
study:  "18 u.s.c." /2 1030 /s fraud; "18 u.s.c." /2 1030 /p evaluation /p damages; "18 
u.s.c." /2 1030 /p damages; computer /1 crime /p fraud; computer /1 crime /p fraud /p 
damages.  Information such as case holding, facts, nature of company, type of incident, 
category of incident, total amount of damage, number of victims, income of victims, and 
statements made by expert witnesses, were analyzed from more than twenty cases.  The 
result of these cases were similar to results of the Incident Cost Analysis and Modeling 
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Project, ICAMP, [15] where thirty information security incidents from universities across 
the nation were investigated.  This author [25], and the final report of ICAMP, both 
acknowledge that the value of intangible damages in many cases could be considerably 
more than the tangible damages, such as downtime cost.  However, despite their 
importance, they are missed in investigations because of the difficulty of calculating the 
intangible cost. 
 In the category of assets, one through five mentioned above, information assets 
are the most difficult group to assess.  Information values can be derived by looking at 
three cost areas [19].  The first is replacement costs, which occur whenever information 
resources are destroyed, damaged, contaminated, or physically stolen.  These costs are a 
function of readily discernible marketplace variables, including costs to purchase, 
transcribe from public resources, collect and reconstruct data.  The second area is 
unavailability costs, which accrue whenever information resources are not available for a 
period of time; either because they were destroyed or stolen, or because they were 
sufficiently damaged, or contaminated as to be partially or completely useless.  Those 
costs are estimated by considering time intervals beginning from the point in time when 
the asset becomes unavailable and ending at the point when it becomes available.  They 
can include: staff overtime; attrition and training; idled staff; facilities and resources; 
inability to pay bills or pay clients; deliver products and services; lost interest or 
borrowed money; costs of using alternative resources; potential for fraud and abuse; 
legal, regulatory, civil, and criminal properties; litigation expenses; and reduced market 
share, customer goodwill, credit rating, and stock values.   The third area is disclosure 
costs resulting from braches of confidentiality.  Costs in this category could result from 
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lost market share or competitive advantage, blackmail, legal, regulatory, civil and 
criminal penalties, litigation expenses, and impact on credit rating and stock values.  An 
information asset could be subject to losses in multiple categories.  The associated costs 
are added if they represent distinct losses. 
One approach to combining tangible and intangible losses is to use scoring tables, 
as shown in Tables 1 and 2: 
 
Table 1- Example of a scoring table for intangible damages 
Intangible Damage Valuation Score 
Embarrassment restricted to within the 
project or work site 
1 
Embarrassment spread to other work areas 
of operating group or division 
1-3 
Embarrassment spread throughout the 
enterprise 
3-5 
Public made aware through local press 
coverage 
5-7 
Adverse national press 7-9 
Major stock price impact/bankruptcy 10 
 
 
Table 2-Example of a scoring table for financial losses 
Intangible Damage Valuation Score 
Under $1M 1 
Between $1Mand $4M 1-3 
Between $4M and $16M 3-5 
Between $16M and $64M 5-7 
Between $64M and $256M 7-9 




Table 1 defines valuation scores for intangible damages that might be caused by 
an incident, and Table 2 shows the financial loss table for these valuation scores.  The 
values found in the tables could be derived from meetings with experts from the various 
departments and business units within the company.  For example, one can assign the 
valuation score of one to an attack to a company’s intranet.  With the probability of 0.2, 
the expected intangible damage of such an attack for the company with the gross annual 
revenue of $1billion, will be $200,000.  To select cost-effective control measures, one 
may calculate the total expected damage of 220,000 by adding the intangible damage and 
the $20,000, which is the direct cost of the downtime of the network valuation scores.   
These valuation scores will be described in Section 6-2-4. 
 
 
Calculating the Expected Cost of an Incident 







Where EC is the total expected cost of the incidents, APi the assessed probability of the 
occurrence of incident i, and Ci the cost for damage caused by incident i.  For example, 
an unauthorized person might access the credit card numbers of clients of a financial 
institution.  This can cause total tangible and intangible losses of $15 million to the 
institution.  A probability of 5 percent for the occurrence of this threat results in an 
expected damage of:  $15,000, 000 × 0.05 = $750,000.  
It is difficult to come up with exact probabilities of information security incidents.  
Therefore, there is a need for a practical methodology to quantify such probabilities.  This 
research has outlined a procedure for evaluating possible losses due to security incidents 
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based on the use of questionnaires and answers given on scales of “very high” to “very 
low.”  This procedure can form part of an overall risk assessment model that enables 
security managers to allocate resources in the most effective manner, as presented in 
upcoming sections. 
 
3.6 Analysis of Cost of Security Breach Announcements  
The relationship between information system security and market valuations can be 
traced to the trust placed by customers and partners who do business with the firm 
through the Internet.  Customer and partner trust assume more significance in electronic 
commerce transactions because of concerns related to data privacy.  A security incident 
can irrevocably damage the trust and confidence required to build a long-term 
relationship with customer and partner.  Dissatisfied customers can switch to competitors 
that are just a click away.  Thus, a perception of low security can have a profound 
financial impact on the firm.  Security problems may also signal to the market a lack of 
concern for customer privacy and poor security practices within the firm.  These signals 
in turn lead investors to question the long-term performance of the firm.  In efficient 
capital markets, investors are believed to revise their expectations based on new 
information in announcements.  Investor confidence is reflected in stock prices.  If 
security breaches are expected to reduce future cash flows, capital markets would 





This author has also explained the relationship between: 
• Confidentiality of data  
• Trust, and  
• Some initiatives made by the U.S. government to establish such a relationship  
This author also addresses the challenges of establishing these relationships [23].  
Personal data protection is based on the defense of the right of privacy.  This is a key 
concern for internet users, who may be wary of the possible misuse of their personal data 
by companies or institutions.  Accordingly, it is essential for any organization wishing to 
enhance its credibility with potential consumers or users, to establish an effective data 
protection policy and to show a clear interest in respecting relevant regulations.  
Providing confidentiality of data is crucial in building trust for citizens to interact with 
the government via the Internet. 
As an effort to build this trust and provide data confidentiality, the U.S. government 
has created several interrelated initiatives [9].  The first is the creation of a public-key 
infrastructure (PKI) through the government-wide Access Certificates for Electronic 
Services (ACES) program.  The Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA), which 
enables interoperability among PKI domains, and the e-authentication, which begins by 
providing authentication services to 22 U.S. e-government initiatives, are other U.S. 
government plans for assuring data confidentiality.  PKI seems to be a proper security 
model for e-government transactions and for overcoming the lack of trust for on-line 
transactions, however, there are still some challenges. 
 First, in order to develop an interoperable government wide system, agency PKIs will 
have to work seamlessly with each other, yet current PKI products and implementations 
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suffer from interoperability problems.  Ensuring the ability of agency PKIs to process 
certificates from all potential sources in a consistent manner will require that application 
software, certificates, and related infrastructure conform to some minimum standards. 
 Second, because full-featured organizational PKIs are rare in some countries, like 
New Zealand, it is not yet known how well this technology will operate as its use grows 
(http://www.e-government.govt.nz/).  New Zealand government agencies have only 
limited experience with PKI, and much of it is based on pilot projects or relatively small-
scale applications. Some examples in the New Zealand government are the Treasury 
Crown Financial Information System net, CFISnet, with some 200 certificates, including 
one user in each government agency, and New Zealand Health Information Service, 
NZHIS, with 400 certificates. 
 Third, adoption of the technology may be impeded by the high cost associated with 
building a PKI and enabling software applications to use and maintain it. These costs can 
easily add up to millions of dollars. 
 Fourth, an effective PKI at any level within the government will require well-defined 
policies and procedures for ensuring that an appropriate level of security is maintained on 
an ongoing basis. Establishing such policies will require resolution of a number of 
sensitive issues in areas such as governance, management of policies and standards, 
privacy protection, encryption key recovery, and how employees will be expected to 
identify themselves and secure their electronic PKIs. 
Finally, as with any security technology, the success of a PKI implementation will 
depend on how well people interact with the system and how well the system is 
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implemented.  Thus, agencies will be faced with the challenge of training and involving 
both users and system administrators in the adoption of a significant new technology. 
This author has conducted personal interviews with law enforcement agencies 
dealing with computer crime and with executives from financial institutions dealing with 
security issues.  In addition, this author did a literature review of cases prosecuted by the 
Department of Justice including the evaluation of damages and financial awards [24].  
This review provides a significant negative market reaction to information security 
breaches involving unauthorized access to confidential data; but no significant market 
reaction when the breach does not involve access to confidential data [11].  This finding 
is actually consistent with the findings from the 2002 CSI/FBI Survey, which suggests 
that among information security breaches, the most serious financial losses were related 
to theft of proprietary information.  This is also consistent with the recently prosecuted 
computer cases by the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, CCIPS, of the 
Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.  According to CCIPS, 91% of the 
cases that have been prosecuted under the computer crime statute, 18 U.S.C. 1030, are 
the cases related to the violation of confidentiality of information.  As an example of 
these cases, in November 2001, two former Cisco Systems, Inc., accountants were 
sentenced to 34 months in prison for illegally issuing almost $8 million in Cisco stock to 
themselves.   This author has sorted the information provided by the 2002 CSI/FBI 
Survey according to the percentage of detected attacks by respondents, and mapped these 
attacks into our three dimensional model as expressed in Table 3. 
These findings reveal that breaches involving unauthorized access to confidential 
information are quite different than attacks that do not involve access to confidential 
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information.  Once confidential information has been accessed in an unauthorized 
manner, the value of such a strategic asset may be permanently compromised.  For 
example, a firm’s customer list may be an important proprietary asset.  Once this list has 
been accessed without authorization, others may be able to use the list for marketing and 
other purposes.  This may permanently impair the list’s value to the firm that created and 
owned it.  In the cases of breaches that do not involve unauthorized access to confidential 
information, the underlying assets generally relate to operations.   
While the firm may lose the ability to use these assets for some period of time, the 
loss is usually temporary.  Consider the case of a denial of service attack.  During the 
attack, the firm may not be able to conduct operations, take customer orders, reservations 
etc.  Once the attack ends, and any necessary system changes are made, the firm can 
resume operations; and the value of its operating system is not permanently impaired.  
Findings provide some limited support for a negative stock market reaction to the widely 
reported information security breaches.  This means that, customers, stockholders, and 
other stakeholders would probably be willing to accept some types of information 
security breaches, such as denial of service attacks, as a routine risk and a normal cost of 
doing business.  As an example, this author has calculated the tangible cost for break-in 
using buffer overflow attacks against Web servers from real incidents in five different 






Total productivity lost 
Total downtime; time to access and repair damage: 49 hours 
Total productivity lost: 49 hours × 30% time users lost ×500 users = 7,350 hours 
Cost of downtime (Total productivity lost × percentage of staff) × hourly rate 
Employees with annual salary of $20,000   
(7,350 hours × 55% of staff) × $10 per hour → $40,425 
Employees with annual salary of $30,000   
(7,350 hours × 30% of staff) × $15 per hour → $33,075 
Employees with annual salary of $45,000   
(7,350 hours × 15% of staff) × $22.5 per hour → $24,806 
Total cost for downtime→ $98,306 
This total cost for downtime seems to be very low compared with damages of 
millions of dollars in cases where violation of data confidentiality occurred. 
  The literature review also indicates that compromised firms, on average, lose 
approximately 2.1% of their market value within two days after the event; while security 
vendors gain an average of 1.36% from each such announcement [14].  It also shows that 
negative average impact associated with an announcement decreases with the size of the 
firm and this suggests that smaller firms are penalized more than larger firms.  This result 
for the managers of small firms serves as a reminder of the importance of security for 
survivability of these firms.  However, the authors do not present detailed data, and thus 
it is not possible for readers to draw conclusions about the absolute loss of market values.  
Although the market penalizes all firms for security breaches, internet firms are penalized 
more compared with conventional firms.  A possible explanation for this effect is the 
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greater dependency by the firms on the Internet to generate revenue.  Firms that solely 
depend on the Internet as a revenue-generating mechanism pay higher prices in case of a 
security breach than firms that have multiple-sale channels.   
 
Table 3- Combination of agents, techniques, security measures, and percentage 
detected in 2002 (Using the data from 2002 CSI/FBI survey) 
 
Attack Agent Threat % Detected  Security Measure 
Virus Unauthorized SW 85 Data Integrity 
Insider Abuse of 
Net Access 
Authorized SW & Personnel  78 Authentication & 
Access Control 




55 ALL five Measures 
Denial of Service Unauthorized SW 40 Authentication  & 
Access Control 
System Penetration Unauthorized SW & HW 40 Authentication  & 
Access Control 
Unauthorized 
Access by Insiders 






SW & procedural 20 Authentication  & 
Access Control 
Financial Fraud Unauthorized & 
Authorized 
Procedural 12 Authentication  & 
Access Control 
Telecom Fraud Unauthorized SW & HW 9 Authentication  & 
Access Control 
Sabotage Unauthorized & 
Authorized & Envr. 
HW & Physical 8 Access Control 
Telecom 
Eavesdropping 
Unauthorized HW 6 Data Confidentiality 
Active Wiretap Unauthorized HW 1 Data Confidentiality 
& Data Integrity 
  
This research also tried to investigate the long-term impact of the announcement 
of a security breach on firms by comparing the stock value of the victimized firms with 
their industry indexes. A sample of eight companies: Boeing, First Data Corp, McGraw-
Hill, Yahoo, Ebay, Egghead, Raytheon, and Northwest Airline, who had suffered from a 
publicized security breach were chosen.  The stock values of these companies, on the day 
of the incident, two days, 7 days, one month, one quarter, two quarters, three quarters, 
 44
and four quarters, before and after the incident, were recorded from the Standards and 
Poor’s publications [59, 60, 61].  These numbers were also compared with the trend of 
their related industries in that period of time.  However, because of the lack of data points 
and insufficient information, it was concluded that one cannot draw a definite conclusion 




















Probability of Security Incidents 
 
4.1 Subjective Probability Assessment 
In practical terms, the evaluation of security risks eventually leads to subjective 
assessment supported by guidelines or some risk assessment system.  This research 
provides a methodology by which the process can be made more systematic. 
Estimating the probability of attacks caused by humans using subjective evaluation 
can be complex.  One should consider the following factors: 
1- Motive.  How motivated is the attacker? Is the attacker motivated by political 
concerns? Is the attacker a disgruntled employee? Is an asset an especially 
attractive target for attackers? 
2- Means.  Which attacks can affect the critical assets? How sophisticated are the 
attacks? Do likely attackers have the skills to execute the attacks? 
3- Opportunity.  How vulnerable is the computing infrastructure?  How vulnerable 
are specific critical assets. 
 
4.2 Possible Pitfalls of Subjective Analysis 
This author wishes to warn managers of some cognitive biases that stem from the reliance 
on judgmental heuristics, which may occur in subjective analysis. The origins of these 
pitfalls can be classified into three types: 
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Representativeness. In the representativeness heuristic, the probability that for 
example Bob is a hacker, is assessed by the degree to which he is representative of, or 
similar to, the stereotype of a hacker.  This approach for estimating probability can lead 
to serious errors, because similarity, or representativeness, is not influenced by several 
factors that should affect determining of probability.   
Availability.  There are situations in which people look at the frequency of a class 
or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be 
brought to mind.  For example, one may access the risk of disclosure of information 
among financial institutions, by hearing about such occurrences from one’s 
acquaintances.  Availability is a useful clue for assessing frequency or probability, 
because instances of large classes are usually recalled better and faster than instances of 
less frequent classes.  However, availability is affected by factors other than frequency or 
probability.  Consequently, the reliance on availability can lead to biases.    
Adjustment and anchoring.  In many situations, people make estimates by starting 
from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer.  The initial value, or 
starting point, may be suggested by the formulation of the problem, or it may be the result 
of a partial computation.  In either case, adjustments are typically insufficient.  That is, 
different starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial 
values. 
In spite of these pitfalls, this author believes that subjective analysis can be 
employed usefully in information security assessment, even when quantitative data is not 
available or a formal process description is not required [26].  Previous attempts to 
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quantify the likelihood of attacks provide examples of the ability of subjective analysis 
without quantitative data [51, 65]. 
 
4.3 Scope of Subjective Analysis 
Among information security experts, there appears to be no agreement regarding the best 
or the most appropriate method to assess the probability of computer security incidents.  
There does exist, however, a hierarchy of approaches such as checklists and scenario 
generation techniques that require the user to have only a minimum knowledge of 
information system security [70].  To have a well-defined scope for the checklist, one can 
follow the formats that are provided by British Standards [7], or the National Security 
Agency [37].    
The National Security Agency, suggests the following eighteen areas for 
information security assessment, which is more comprehensive than the British 
Standards:  
• Information security documentation  
• Identification and authentication  
• Account management (establishment, deletion, expiration) 
• Session control management (access control lists, files, directions, servers, 
remote dial up, Internet services)  
• External connectivity  
• Telecommunications  
• System security administration  
• Auditing  
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• Virus protection  
• Contingency planning 
• System maintenance procedures  
• Configuration management 
• Back up policies  
• Labeling  
• Media sanitization/Disposal  
• Physical/Environmental controls  
• Personnel security 
• Training and awareness 
 
4.4 Probability Assessment 
To derive an overall likelihood rating that a potential vulnerability may be exploited, 
these governing factors should be considered: threat-source motivation and capability; 
nature of the vulnerability; and existence and effectiveness of current controls 
The likelihood that a potential vulnerability could be exploited by a given threat-
source can be described as high, medium, or low.  In defining these likelihoods, this 
author follows the likelihood determination by NIST [63]:  
High likelihood.  The threat-source is highly motivated and sufficiently capable; 
and controls are ineffective in preventing penetration. 
Medium likelihood.  The threat-source is motivated and capable; but controls are 
in place that may impede a successful attack. 
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Low likelihood.  The threat-source lacks motivation or capability, or controls are 
in place to prevent, or at least significantly impede the attack.  
One can also use these qualitative ratings to assign values for a quantitative 
evaluation to use in developing a checklist; for example: high likelihood at 0.9, medium 
likelihood at 0.5, and low likelihood at 0.1.  We can also use a more detailed scale such 
as: very high, high, medium, low, and very low, and use 0.9, 0.7, 0.5, 0.3, and 0.1, 
respectively, for these likelihoods. 
The checklist can be written in a question format and should allow three possible 
answers: “yes”, “no”, or “not relevant”. Questions should be asked in a way that a “yes” 
answer mean that the control exists and a “no” answer means that the control does not 
exist.  A control is relevant when both the asset to be protected and the threat exist. 
For example, one critical element to evaluate data integrity can be, “Is virus 
detection and elimination software installed and activated?” A subordinate question for 
the above question could be, “Are virus scans automatic?”  The answer to this question 
might be “yes”, “no”, or “not relevant”.  A metric for this evaluation can be the 
percentage of systems with automatic virus scanning, which can help gauge the risk 
exposure caused by known viruses.   
 
Assessing probability: 
In this section, we propose a procedure by which quantitative answers to a detailed 
security questionnaire can be compiled into an overall vulnerability measure.  Conducting 
the survey with the checklist, we can assess the vulnerability of each system under 
examination by defining the following parameters and calculations: 
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N (VH): Number of questions with very high importance  
N (H): Number of questions with high importance  
N (M): Number of questions with medium importance  
N (L): Number of questions with low importance  
N (VL): Number of questions with very low importance  
NR (VH): Number of relevant questions with very high importance  
NR (H): Number of relevant questions with high importance  
NR (M): Number of relevant questions with medium importance  
NR (L): Number of relevant questions with low importance  
NR (VL): Number of relevant questions with very low importance   
NN (VH): Number of “no” answers to relevant questions with very high 
importance  
NN (H): Number of “no” answers to relevant questions with high importance 
NN (M): Number of “no” answers to relevant questions with medium 
importance  
NN (L): Number of “no” answers to relevant questions with low importance  
NN (VL): Number of “no” answers to relevant questions with very low 
importance 
NP: Normalized probability 
IP: Index of probability  
SWP:  Sum of probability weights  
JP:  Justified probability  
MW: Maximum weight 
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AP: Assessed probability  
 
We would have: 
[ ]
( )
NR (VH) / N (VH) × 0.9 + NR (H) / N (H) × 0.7+ ··· + NR (VL) / N (VL) × 0.1
NP  =   
0.9 + 0.7 + 0.5 + 0.3 + 0.1
I P = 1 NP  
SWP = NN (VH) × 0.9 + NN (H) × 0.7 +NN (M) × 0.5 + NN (L) × 0.3 +NN (VL) × 0.1
 
JP = SWP × IP  
MW  = N (VH) × 0.9 + N (H) × 0.7  +N (M) × 0.5 + N (L) × 0.3 +N (VL) × 0.1
 
 AP = JP MW   
For example, the checklist for the area of integrity may include 20, 40, 50, 30, and 15 
questions in a scale of importance of very high, high, medium, low, and very low; and 
only 10, 30, 40, 24, and 12 may be relevant to the specific vulnerability regarding 
integrity.  If we have 7, 25, 36, 20, and 9 “no” answers (meaning control does not exist), 
respectively, following the proposed method; we obtain an assessed probability of AP = 
0.88.  This would imply that there is an 88% chance of a data integrity violation.  The 
assessed probability is a number between zero and one, with zero representing an incident 






Classification of Security Threats in Information Systems 
 
Before we analyze the security threats and develop a scheme or a methodology to 
optimally allocate resources and deploy control measures against these threats, we need a 
good classification scheme for threats.  A taxonomy to be used in this research can be 
defined as follows: 
“Any taxonomy that is used to price security failures should be deterministic and 
complete.  No security failure should be left unclassified and no security failure    
should fall into more than one classification” [10]. 
In general, categorizing a phenomenon makes systematic studies possible.  In 
particular, an organized classification of threats to e-commerce can help managers to 
build systems that are less vulnerable.  An established classification would also be useful 
when reporting incidents to incident response teams.  Lindqvist [43] recommends the 
following properties for the classification for information security: 
• The categories should be mutually exclusive that is every specimen should fit in 
at most one category.  And collectively exhaustive, that is every specimen should 
fit in at least one category. 
• Every category should be accompanied by clear and unambiguous criteria 
defining what specimens are to be put in that category. 
• The taxonomy should be comprehensible and useful, not only to experts in 
security, but also to users and administrators with less knowledge and experience. 
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• The terminology of the taxonomy should comply with established security 
terminology; something that is not always easy to define. 
 
5.1 A Review of Existing Taxonomies 
Literature review has identified many attempts in the classification of security threats.   
The taxonomy developed by the Naval Research Laboratory [41], classifies each 
security flaw according to genesis (caused intentionally or inadvertently), time of 
introduction (during development, maintenance, or operation), and location (software or 
hardware). 
The taxonomy developed by Neumann and Parker [48], categorizes computer 
misuse techniques into nine classes (that are ordered from the physical world to the 
hardware and software and from unauthorized use to misuse of authority, etc).  This 
classification seems to cover most of the known techniques covering external attacks as 
well as unauthorized users misusing their privileges.  However, it has some shortcomings 
in assigning an intrusion to one class or another, or both.   
The DARPA’s Intrusion Detection Evaluation Taxonomy [44], classifies attack 
types into four groups: 1- Denial of Service, 2- Remote to Local (an attacker who gains 
access to victim’s machine), , 3- User to Root ( a local user on a machine is able to obtain 
privileges normally reserved for the UNIX root or super user), and 
4- Surveillance/Probing.  This taxonomy uses a reasonable, but not exhaustive, set of 
attacks with a limited set of actions performed as a part of each attack This taxonomy 
also uses a simple network topology, and a non-restrictive security policy. 
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Schummacher and Ghosh [57] have defined systematic, communication, physical, 
personnel, application, performance, design correctness; as the components, and privacy, 
integrity, accountability, reliability, connectivity, recovery, liability, and uncertainty, as 
the attributes of the information security.  Pflegger [52] also groups the potential threats 
to a network into seven categories:  wiretapping, impersonation, message confidentiality 
violations, message integrity violations, hacking, code integrity, and denial of service.   
This author’s opinion is that these taxonomies, although they address the most 
important computer security threats, either do not cover all of them or do not allow them 
to be considered independently. 
 
5.2 A Model for Threat Classification and Control Measures 
We consider threats to a network system from two points of view: 1- Threat agent, and  
2- Penetration technique.  A threat is manifested by a threat agent using a specific 
penetration technique to produce an undesired effect on the network.   
Threat Agents  
 Threat agents are classified into environmental factors, authorized users, and 
unauthorized users. 
Environmental Factors: Although it is common sense, one should remember to account 
for environmental factors.  Some areas are more prone to certain environmental 
influences and natural disasters than others.  Some types of disasters, such as fire, are not 
geographically dependent, while others, such as tornadoes and floods, can be anticipated 
on a more regular basis in specific areas.  In addition to the natural disasters, attention 
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should be paid to the danger of mechanical and electrical equipment failure and the 
interruption of electrical power.   
Authorized users: Authorized users and personnel engaged in supporting operations can 
be considered as potential threats when they exceed their privileges and authorities or 
commit errors, thus affecting the ability of the system to perform its mission.  Personnel 
granted access to systems or occupying positions of special trust, and having the 
capability or opportunity to abuse their access authorities, privileges, or trusts, should be 
considered as potential threats. 
Unauthorized users: An unauthorized user can be anyone not engaged in supporting 
operations that, by design, attempts to interrupt the productivity of the system or 
operation either overtly or covertly.  Overt methods could include outright acts of 
sabotage affecting hardware and associated equipment. Covert methods are more subtle 
efforts of destruction, which could be accomplished through the manipulation of 
software, both systems and application. 
Techniques 
Techniques can be classified into physical, personnel, hardware, software, and procedural 
including: 
Physical: Physical penetration implies use of a physical means to gain entry into 
restricted areas such as buildings, compound rooms, or any other designated areas. 
Personnel: Penetration techniques and methods generally deal with the subverting of 
personnel who are authorized some degree of access and privilege regarding a system, 
either as users or operators. Operators could include system-analysts, programmers, 
input/output schedulers, etc.  They can be recruited by a threat agent and used to 
 56
penetrate the system, operation or facility, or they themselves can become disaffected or 
motivated to mount an attack.   
Hardware: Attacks can be mounted against hardware for the purpose of using the 
hardware as a means of subverting or denying use of the system.  A physical attack 
against the equipment, a bug implanted within a hardware controller, or an attack against 
the supporting utilities, are means of subverting the system by using the characteristics of 
the hardware.  Hardware, as used in this category, generally includes any piece of 
equipment that is part of the system, (i.e., the mainframe, peripherals, communications 
controllers, or modems).  It also includes indirect system support equipment, such as 
power supplies, air conditioning systems, backup power, etc. 
Software: Software penetration techniques can be directed against system software, 
application programs, or utility routines.  Software attacks can range from discreet 
alterations that are subtly imposed for the purpose of compromising the system, to less 
discreet changes intended to produce results such as destruction of data or other 
important systems features. 
Procedural: Authorized or unauthorized users can penetrate the system due to lack or 
inadequacy of controls, or failure to adhere to existing controls.  Examples of procedural 
penetration include former employees retaining and using valid passwords, unauthorized 
personnel picking up output, and users browsing without being detected due to failure to 
diligently check audit trails. 
At a more detailed level, the ISO 7498-2 Standard [39], lists five security control 
measures to combat these threats: 1) Authentication, 2) Data Confidentiality,      3) 
Access Control, 4) Data integrity, and 5) Non-repudiation.  This classification is widely 
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accepted among computer security experts, and this author also recommends them as 
good control measures.  
Authentication. Authentication is the binding of an identity to a subject [4].  The 
external entity must provide information to enable the system to confirm its identity.  
This information may come from one or more of the following: 
1- What the entity knows, such as passwords or confidential information 
2- What the entity has, such as a card 
3- What the entity is, such as fingerprints or retinal characteristics 
4- Where the entity is, such as in front of a particular terminal 
The authentication process consists of obtaining the authentication information 
from an entity, analyzing the data, and determining if it is associated with that entity. 
Kerberos and X.509 are some examples of authentication applications which are widely 
used in securing networks.  Kerberos is an authentication protocol based on conventional 
encryption that has received widespread support and it is used in a variety of systems 
[62].  X.509 specifies an authentication algorithm and defines a certificate facility.  The 
latter enables users to obtain certificates of public keys so that a community of users can 
have confidence in the validity of the public keys.  This facility is employed as a building 
block in a number of applications.  
Data confidentiality.  Confidentiality is the concealment of information or 
resources.  Data can be gathered by many means such as tapping wires, planting bugs in 
output devices, sifting through trash receptacles, monitoring electromagnetic radiation, 
bribing key employees, inferring one data point from other values, or simply requesting 
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the data.  Because data are often available in a form people can read, the confidentiality 
of data is a major concern of information security.   
All the mechanisms that enforce confidentiality require supporting services from 
the system.  The assumption is that the security services can rely on the kernel, and other 
agents, to supply correct data.  Thus, assumptions and trust underlie confidentiality 
mechanisms.  Pretty Good Privacy, PGP, and Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail 
Extension, S/MIME are examples of mechanisms for providing confidentiality and 
authentication for electronic mail.   
PGP is an encipherment program widely used to provide privacy for electronic 
mail throughout the internet and to sign files digitally.  It uses a certificate-based key 
management infrastructure for user’s public keys.  S/MIME is very much like PGP; its 
difference is the method of key exchange.   Basic PGP depends on each user’s 
exchanging keys with all potential recipients and establishing a ring of trusted recipients.  
S/MIME uses hierarchal validated certificates, usually represented in X.509 format, for 
key exchange.  Thus, with S/MIME the sender and the recipient do not need to have 
exchanged keys in advance as long as they have a common certifier they both trust.  
S/MIME works with a variety of cryptographic algorithms, such as Digital Encryption 
System, DES, and Advanced Encryption System, AES.     
Access control.  Access control mechanisms support confidentiality of 
information.  One access control mechanism for preserving confidentiality is 
cryptography, which scrambles data to make it incomprehensible.  In the context of 
network security, access control is the ability to limit and to control the access to host 
systems and applications via communication links.  To achieve this control, each entity 
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trying to gain access must first be identified, or authenticated, so that access rights can be 
tailored to the individual.  
Data integrity.  Integrity refers to the trustworthiness of data or resources, and it is 
usually phrased in terms of preventing improper or unauthorized change.  Integrity 
includes data integrity (the content of information) and origin of integrity (the source of 
data).  Integrity mechanisms fall into two classes: prevention mechanisms and detection 
mechanisms.   
Prevention mechanisms seek to maintain the integrity of data by blocking any 
unauthorized attempt to change the data or any attempt to change the data in unauthorized 
ways.  Detection mechanisms do not try to prevent violations of integrity; they simply 
report that the data’s integrity is no longer trustworthy.  Detection mechanisms may 
analyze system events, user or system actions, to detect problems or more commonly, 
may analyze the data itself to see if required or expected constraints still hold.  The 
mechanisms may report the actual cause of integrity violation (a specific part was 
altered), or they may simply report that the file is now corrupt.   
Working with integrity is very different from working with confidentiality.  With 
confidentiality, the data is either compromised or it is not; but integrity includes both the 
correctness and the trustworthiness of the data.  The origin of data, how and from whom 
it was obtained, how well the data was protected before it arrived at the current machine, 
and how well the data is protected on the current machine, all affect the integrity of the 
data.   
Non-repudiation. Non repudiation prevents either sender or receiver from denying a 
transmitted message.  Thus when a message is sent, the receiver can prove that the 
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message was in fact sent by the alleged sender.  Similarly, when a message is received, 
the sender can prove that the message was in fact received by the alleged receiver.  
These security measures, along with agents and techniques, are shown in Figure 
2. One can use this figure to classify threats (agents and the techniques) to information 
systems and security measures to confront these threats.   For example, access control is 
one of the security measures to confront the threats that may be caused by an 
unauthorized user through software.  In total, there are 5 × 3 × 5 combinations of threat 
techniques, agents, and control measures; however not all of these combinations are 
applicable. For example, non-repudiation cannot be a security measure for the threats 
caused by environmental factors or by a procedural technique.  This three-dimensional 
demonstration of threat agents, techniques, and security control measures can be used for 
a better quantitative assessment and management of security risk.  Figure 3 shows virus, 
denial of service attack, and insider abuse of net access as an example of threats and 



























































Developing a Risk Management System 
 
6.1 A Critical overview 
Risk can be defined as:  “The potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of 
an asset or group of assets to cause loss or damage to the assets”, and vulnerability can be 
defined as: “A weakness of an asset or group of assets which can be exploited by a 
threat” [40].   
Risk assessment is the process for determining whether existing or proposed 
safeguards are adequate to protect information resources from likely threats [19].  It 
involves identifying assets to be protected, threats to those assets and the likelihood of 
threat occurrence.  Risk assessment also identifies vulnerabilities that could be exploited, 
losses that could result from an attack, and safeguards that are or could be installed.  The 
objective is cost-effective safeguards; that is, safeguards that cost no more than the 
expected level of loss from an attack. 
Information security incidents are adverse events that cause losses to business; 
therefore, information security is a risk management application, with the intent to 
manage the cost of information risk to the business.  Literature review has identified a 
stream of research on risk assessment of information systems security incidents [1, 3, 6, 
12, 47, 58].  Specific methods for undertaking information security risks analysis fall into 




The quantitative approach assumes that it is possible to associate a level of risk with each 
hazard identified and attempts to calculate the value of the likely damage should the risk 
become reality.  The focus is the production of an Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE), figure 
which is calculated for each threat by establishing two factors [67]: 
1- Its probability of occurrence over a specified time period 
2- The amount of loss that would be incurred 
These quantities are multiplied to obtain the estimated ALE which is compared with 
the cost of suitable control measures.  The philosophy here is that, if the cost of a control 
measure is less than the calculated ALE, then implementing the control measure would 
be a cost-effective solution, otherwise alternative solutions should be considered. 
 
Qualitative methods 
The qualitative approach assesses risks on the basis of the capability to identify threats 
and vulnerabilities correctly.  Unlike the quantitative approach, precise values are not 
sought and risks are expressed in terms of descriptive variables such as “high”, 
“medium”, or “low”; the rationale being that the consequences of some types of loss, 
such as corruption or modification of data, cannot be expressed in terms of monetary 






Comparison of Quantitative and Qualitative methods and choosing an appropriate 
method 
The calculation of an ALE is a method which has been used by insurance 
companies for some time; and at present, the majority of quantitative computer security 
risk analysis methods use this technique.  However, unlike insurance risks which focus 
on losses arising from insurance claims, system security risks are of a more involved 
nature which can only be evaluated by considering a complex combination of possible 
consequences.  Moreover, system security risks are not readily specified in purely 
monetary terms.  Potential losses are often related to factors such as corporate goodwill 
or other non-monetary assets.  For example, the extent of loss in customer confidence 
following a security breach is extremely difficult to quantify before the event.  Not only it 
is difficult to put a precise financial value to a wide range of threats, but it is common for 
people to be unwilling to assign a monetary measure at all in situations where threats 
have a social impact, for example disclosure of health information. 
The advantages of quantitative methods lie in their ability to relate expenditure to 
threat value in percentage terms and to direct resources proportionally [13].  However, 
even though a single figure such as the ALE is an easily perceived summary of the cost 
of the threats, it must be recognized that it is derived from data and probabilities which 
frequently do not have a strong empirical basis [29].  Problems arise when too much faith 
is placed in what appear to be exact and precise figures as the probabilities and data used 
in this type of approach are often not very accurate. 
A major advantage of the qualitative approach is the time and expense required to 
make the assessment.  The quantitative approach usually requires an in-depth and 
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extensive study of the system/organization in order to establish threats and 
vulnerabilities, to determine probabilities and to obtain cost figures.  In nearly all cases, 
such a study is a time consuming effort and is characterized by fairly extensive surveys 
including many people in the organization.  On the other hand, qualitative methods can 
usually be completed in less time with a smaller number of personnel as they do not 
require the same type of data collection and mathematical calculations.  However, care 
must be taken when attempts are made to compare qualitative values such as high, 
medium, and low risks.  One manager’s perception of a high risk could be considered a 
low risk by another manager.  It is suggested that when deciding which approach to use, 
the following factors could be taken into consideration [69]: 
• Cost- How much is the organization willing to spend? 
• Appropriateness- Organizations must select the most appropriate risk 
analysis method for their particular environment. 
• Adaptability- Methods must relate to the current working practice. 
• Completeness- It must be ensured that the method encompasses all 
possible risks. 
Paying close attention to the second factor (i.e., appropriateness) is important for 
decision makers in organizations.  The following can be suggested as steps for measuring 
suitability in selecting a risk management approach.  For measuring suitability, one must: 
 
1- Establish a set of criteria that describe a method’s suitability. 
2- Define the suitability criteria in terms of related attributes. 
3- Specify metrics that describe presence of the attributes. 
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4- Make a quantitative statement of the appearance of a suitability criterion 
by determining the ratio of actual occurrences of a metric to the number of 
possible occurrences.  This should be done for each criterion. 
5- Use the derived quantitative values for each of the criteria to evaluate and 
compare the variety of methods and tools available to the organization. 
The following seven criteria are also suggested as the suitability criteria: 
1- Consistency- Given a particular system configuration, results obtained 
from independent analysis will not significantly differ. 
2- Usability- The effort necessary to learn, operate, prepare input, and 
interpret output is generally worth the results obtained. 
3- Adaptability- The structure of the method or tool can be applied to a 
variety of computer system configurations and the inputs can easily be 
updated as they periodically change. 
4- Feasibility- The required data is available and can be economically 
gathered. 
5- Completeness- Consideration of all relevant relationships and elements of 
risk management is given. 
6- Validity- The results of the process represent the real phenomenon. 
7- Credibility- The output is believable and has merit. 
 
This research uses a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in 
developing a risk management system for information system security incidents which is 
explained in the following section. 
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6.2 A Risk Management System 
This research has developed a five stage risk management system to help managers to 
identify vulnerabilities to the information systems of their companies, to evaluate the 
existing security measures in place, and to select the most appropriate and cost-effective 
control measures.  This risk management system is shown in Figure 4.   
 
1. Value analysis
a. Determine the sensitivity
    of information
b. Estimate asset values
2. Vulnerability and




    probabilities
4. Select control
    measures
a. Apply search procedure
b. Apply math
     programming approach
5. Implementation of
    alternatives
a. Develop and approve plan
b. Implement control measures
c. Test and evaluate
3. Compute losses due to
    threats and costs of
    control measures
a. Identify control measures
b. Assess changes in threat
     probabilities
  









The five stages of our risk management system are:  
 
6.2.1 Resource and Application Value Analysis 
This can be done in two phases: First, determine the sensitivity of information handled.  
The objective is to relate each application to sensitivity level based upon the most 
sensitive type of data processed (e.g., privacy, asset/resource, proprietary).  This analysis 
provides the framework for subsequent analysis, so its detail and accuracy are important.  
Second, estimate the asset value of automated resources providing support such as 
physical facility, equipment, supplies and software.  
 
6.2.2 Vulnerability and Risk Analysis 
 This analysis is in three parts: 1- Identification of vulnerabilities:  Weakness or flaws in 
the design, implementation, or operation of the security controls of a facility, system or 
operation must be identified; whether through analysis of the security controls alone, or 
as causal factors directly related to a previously identified threat.  2-Weighting of 
vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities just identified, should be considered in relation to each 
other and arrayed according to seriousness and potential degree of exploitability. And, 
finally, 3- Assess threat probabilities: In this step, probabilities of threats are documented.  






6.2.3 Computation of Losses due to Threats and Benefits of Control 
Measures 
 Losses due to threats and benefits of control measures can be computed by defining a 
control measure(s) at an appropriate level. For a control measure at a given level, there is 
the cost of the control measure, its effectiveness, expected damage caused by the threat, 
probability that the threat occurs, expected benefit of the control measure, expected loss 
attributed to the control measure set, etc. Assessing changes in threat probabilities can be 
reflected in fij: effectiveness of control measure i on threat j, which will be used in the 
calculations. 
 
6.2.4 Selection of Control Measures   
At this stage, the system chooses a control measure and level to minimize total cost. 
Enumerating search procedures and mathematical programming approaches can be used 
at this stage.   For this selection we will use a search through the solution space.   To 
select control measures, we use the following parameters and calculations: 
i :  i th control measure; i = 1…….I  
j: j th threat;  j = 1……..J 
Ci: Cost of  control measure i 
fij: effectiveness of control measure i on threat j (Assuming independent control 
measures)  
lj: expected damage caused by threat j  
Pj: probability that threat j occurs  
Bi: Expected benefit of control measure i   
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L: Expected loss of a set of control measures (expected losses left “uncontrolled” 
by control measures)  
C: Cost of control measures  
TC: Total cost of control measures and losses 
vj: Valuation score  
The procedure is: 
1- Measure the expected loss due to the occurrence of the threat:   
 
 2- Compute the benefit of control measures:    
 
3- Compute the total expected loss for control measures: 
 
4- Compute the total cost of control measures: 
5- Compute the total expected cost for each set of control measures: 
 






































As an example of using this system, assume there are five possible threats: 1) Virus, 2) 
Insider abuse of net access, 3) Denial of service, 4) System penetration, and 5) 
Authorized access by insiders.  Access control is evaluated as a possible control measure.  
There are three access control options: 1) Discretionary Access Control (DAC), $250K, 
2) Mandatory Access Control (MAC), $300K, and 3) Role based Access Control 
(RBAC), $500K.  There is the following information presented in Tables 4 and 5:  
 
Table 4- Threat, probability, and expected cost 
Threat 
Number 




Virus 0.3 1000 
Insider abuse 
of net access 
0.1 4000 











Table 5- Effectiveness of control measures (CM) by type of Threat 
      Threat 
 
    CM 
Virus Insider 










DAC 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
MAC 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 
RBAC 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 
 
Considering this information, and also the cost of implementing control measures, the 
outcome of the system will be: 
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• The minimal total cost computed with the given probability vector of threats and 
threats vs. control measures as $1,190,000 
• The initial minimal cost of implementing RBAC as $500,000 and the control 
measure which is selected would be RBAC 
 
6.5 Implementation of Alternatives 
This stage can be done in three phases.  The first phase is developing and approving a 
plan.  To develop a plan, it is necessary to establish priorities for implementation.  
Generally, control measures should be implemented according to severity of the 
undesirable effect being countered, as determined by the preceding analysis.  Using this 
as the basic criterion, other influences can be brought into consideration. Once the plan is 
developed, it must be reviewed and approved by senior management.  The second phase 
is implementation of control measures.  Once the planning documents have been 
completed, action can commence on the implementation of the control measures.  The 
third phase is testing and evaluation of control measures.  Sensitive systems, with the 
strongest security requirements, should have a formal test and evaluation of significant 
control measures immediately prior to and during initial implementation.  The purpose of 
testing and evaluation is to ascertain, with reasonable assurance, that the proposed control 
measure produces the desired effect and will not result in undesirable side effects.   
This system is intended to help managers in: identifying business assets, 
recognizing the threats, assessing the level of business impact that would ensue if the 
threats were to materialize, analyzing vulnerabilities, and, finally, selecting the control 
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measure and suggesting an implementation plan.  This procedure is our first attempt at 
defining this rather complex problem. The following extensions are under consideration:  
• Incorporating more robust solution techniques for large, real-life problems,  
• Differentiating control measures by implementation techniques                   
• Considering the effects resulting from combinations of control measures  
• Performing sensitivity analysis with respect to the inputs, such as probabilities 
of expected threats.  
Current work includes a refinement of the system to incorporate actual field data 

















Chapter seven describes the case studies of this research which was done in 4 steps: 
1. Identifying sources of information  
2. Developing the questionnaire 
3. Analyzing/evaluating the usefulness of answers  
4. Testing and confirming the results at the second round 
At this stage of the research, six information security experts participated.  They are 
from: 1- A consumer advertising service, 2- A law enforcement agency, 3- An 
information security consulting service, 4- A network service provider, 5- An online 
payment service, and 6- An educational service auditor.  Four experts participated in 
round one and two experts, who had contributed in round one, as well as one additional 
expert, participated in round two.  
 
7.1 First Round of Interviews 
The following are the thirteen questions and the answers to the first round of four 
case studies: 
Question 1- What do you think would be the most important threat(s) to the information 
system of your company? 
Case1- “The most important threat that we face would be disclosure of customer data.  
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Because of certain aspects of our business model, we see lots of customer-
provided confidential data, and associate with it certain information that those 
customers prefer to keep private.  The second most important threat would be the 
loss of company proprietary data.” 
 
Case 2- “Virus, Outside intrusion, Denial of Service.” 
Case 3- “Intransigent IT Security teams, Disgruntled Employees, External Hacking, 
Improper password security,   Hardware failures.” 
Case 4- The application 
 
Question 2- How many times have you experienced this type of threat(s)/incident(s) 
during the last 12 months? 
Case1- “We have not had this happen in the last 12 months.  We regularly place certain 
aspect of our intellectual property at customer sites.” 
Case 2- “Virus, One major attack per month average.  Intrusion: one every 6 months 
average. DoS, no major attacks yet.” 
Case 3- “Intransigent IT Security teams:  one, but increasingly likely and debilitating. 6 
months of meetings, etc. to resolve.”   
“Disgruntled Employees: External Hacking: one” 
“Improper password security: one (posted on a public website!!!)” 
“Hardware failures: numerous, but no known data loss.” 
Case 4- “We receive an average of 10,000 application specific attacks a day” 
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Question 3- If the threat has not yet occurred, how long do you think it will be (in 
months) before you suffer such a threat?   
Case1- “We would expect to see such an attack occur within the next 24 months or so.” 
Case 2- “DoS in next 12 months.” 
Case 3- “NA” 
Case 4- “Within months to two years” 
 
Question 4- What type of damages did this/these threat(s) cause?  (or would likely 
cause)? 
Case 1- “If such an attack were to take place, substantial, but not irreparable damage to 
the company brand would occur.  The damage would be dependent on the 
publicity surrounding the access”. 
Case 2- “Virus: shutdown systems, caused rebuilds.  Intrusions: Notification cost, outside 
consulting costs, re-design costs.” 
Case 3- “A lot would depend on what may have been taken, proprietary information, 
intellectual properties, etc.  For example a bank lost several credit cards, identity 
theft, and the bad guy(s) actually were able to charge around $10.00.  But when 
this became public the banks stock feel over 3 points.  This lose could have been 
in the 100’s of 1000’s. ” 
Case 4- “We have had one successful application incident that defaced our homepage 
with profanity. I’m more concerned with what’s to come than what we have 
experienced to date. My concerns lie in someone using our application to access 
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privileged information, planting files on web servers and phasing our customer 
base.” 
 
Question 5- Is/are this/these threat(s) more likely to be caused by unauthorized or 
authorized users by using software techniques? 
Case 1- “Authorized users of the system are unlikely to cause these problems, because 
they are mostly external and minimally motivated to engage in these behaviors.  
Unauthorized attackers are much more worrisome.” 
Case 2- “Unauthorized users” 
Case 3- “Could be both.  In addition social engineering could also be used.” 
Case 4- “Unauthorized users are our focus for now but the authorized users are still of 
concern.” 
 
Question 6- What control measure(s) did you have in place that failed to stop the threat? 
Case 1- “N/A” 
Case 2-“Virus. Scanners. (No signatures, old signatures). Break-in (passwords, firewalls, 
IDS systems)” 
Case 3- “NA” 
Case 4- “There are no control measures in place to counter an application threat.” 
 
Question 7- What type of control measure do you use for this/these threat(s) that do not 
fall in the category of access control, authentication, data confidentiality, data integrity, 
and non-repudiation services? 
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Case 1- “Source code analysis and intrusion detection systems.” 
Case 2- “Background checks” 
Case 3- “This would not apply to us.  We respond after the fact in most cases.  If we are 
consulting we would set up some kind of secure server and/or disaster recovery 
solution. 
Case 4- “We are looking into an application firewall and application auditing software 
for the developers and security team to help mitigate our exposure.” 
 
Question 8- According to the CSI/FBI Survey, attacks which can cause the most serious 
financial damages are: theft of propriety information, financial frauds, and viruses.  Do 
you think this/these attack(s) are more likely to be caused by unauthorized or authorized 
users by using software techniques? 
Case 1- “Your use of the phrase "by software techniques" is not clear, but we think that 
unauthorized external users are the biggest threat.  This is somewhat caused by 
the unusual nature of the data we carry for customers.” 
Case 2- “Techniques? Financial fraud is almost always an insider job, usually with 
authorization.  Viruses are from unauthorized outsides.” 
Case 3- “I believe currently, by far maybe even up to and over 70%, employees cause the 
most damage.  They of course would be using the company’s software products.” 
Case 4- “Because we are a .com company with all employees online at all times with 
little restriction, unauthorized users are presently our biggest threat. Employees 
are always exposed to unauthorized users nefarious techniques.” 
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Question 9- Which combination of control measures do you prefer? 
Case 1- “Effective ones!” 
Case 2- “Policies and processes. Security Architecture including access control and 
proactive methods (Virus scanning). Encryption for storing of sensitive data.” 
Case 3- “First of all you need policies.  Then you would need some kind of hardware 
and/or software monitoring devices.  If probable cause is present, you could take 
control by using a keystroke monitoring device, with the proper authority.” 
Case 4- “Access control and web application security testing and assessment software.” 
 
Question 10- How would you rate the effectiveness of these control measures?  For 
example, to what degree did this/these control measure(s) reduce the probability of the 
threat or the actual cost of the damage? 
Case 1- “Unfortunately, measuring the effectiveness of most of our defensive measures is 
difficult.” 
Case 2- “I am sure that they reduce the risk.  Difficult to determine how much.  Good 
data back up policies reduce the cost to recover.” 
Case 3- “If the employee knows they are monitoring his status, etc., it could be very 
effective.” 
Case 4- “Out of 1 to 10? I would rate it the measures a 7” 
Question 11- In some cases, using stronger control measures can cause dissatisfaction of 
clients, e.g. using stronger encryptions cause delay in response time.  What is the 
maximum response time to a mouse click, in seconds, that you consider acceptable for 
your web-based customers?   
 81
Case 1- “Our web-focused service is intended for occasional, batch-focused use, and 
clients understand that after certain actions, our processing time may be from 
minutes up to days.” 
Case 2- “Cost of encryption in terms of cycles used or mouse click response time is very 
low.  Main dissatisfaction is in the area of passwords and authentication.  i.e. must 
change password every 60 days or requirement to have multiple passwords” 
Case 3- “Probably not our companies issue” 
Case 4- “Zero to 25 seconds” 
 
Question 12- In making financial decisions, do you consider the intangible damages of an 
incident to your company, e.g. negative impact of announcement of a breach on stock 
market or on clients?  If so, what metrics/evaluation criteria do you use to calculate these 
costs?   
Case 1- “Our current methodologies are very informal” 
Case 2- “Reputation risk is a major concern. Difficult to quantify.  I have thought about 
equating the cost of reputation damage to the cost of advertising.  We spend XX 
dollars to advertise our brand.  If it is damaged then we need to spend YY 
additional to bring the image back to where it was.  Therefore the cost of the 
attack was equal to the cost of the additional advertising.  Other cost is the 
manpower cost to manage the incident.” 
Case 3- “NA” 
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Case 4- “The intangible of a service not being offered online has been calculated but the 
negative impact of a breach on clients has only been briefly discussed.” 
 
Question 13- Will you consider transferring risks to an insurance company? If so, do you 
find their policies and coverage reasonable? 
Case 1- “As much as possible” 
Case 2- “Currently looking to purchase Cyber insurance.  There are still a number of 
items to be determined such as deductibles, what is covered.  First party coverage 
vs. third party coverage.  This will probably be a big area in the next few years.” 
Case 3-“This is a somewhat new field, cyber insurance.  Some large insurance companies 
are beginning to write cyber insurance policies under some strict guidelines.  But 
your question is not something we do but we certainly would consult with 
companies about this.  Even to the point of doing a cyber assessment for them.  
As to the insurance companies we would do a cyber assessment for them either 
before or after they write the policies.  We would look for different vulnerabilities 
and other such items.” 
Case 4- “At this point in time, no.” 
 
7.2 Summary of the Answers in the First Round 
The following summarizes answers in the first round: 
• All the respondents listed disclosure and theft of proprietary information as a 
major threat. 
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• Virus, DoS, disgruntled employees, improper password security, hardware 
failures were also mentioned as threats. 
• None to one major attack per month and average of one intrusion every six 
months.  
• All the respondents said they expect at least one major attack during the coming 
twelve to twenty four months,  
• The damage of such an attack would first depend on publicity of the attack, and 
second on costs of system downtime, notification, consulting, and re-design. 
• Unauthorized users were identified as the source of the most important threats to 
an organization which can be caused by software techniques. 
• Most respondents could not describe what exact control measure they had in 
place.  Some listed scanners for viruses, and passwords, firewalls, IDS systems 
for break-ins. 
• Background checks were mentioned as a control measure which is not included in 
our model. 
• All respondents mentioned access control as the most effective control measure 
for a threat.  Respondents were not able to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
control measures, except for one respondent who estimated 70% effectiveness as 
an overall effectiveness for the control measures.. 
• All respondents reported dissatisfaction of users on using passwords and 
authentication and a 25 second tolerance by users for completing a transaction 
were reported. 
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• All respondents emphasized the need for a formal methodology in evaluating 
intangible damages.  Only one respondent provided an approach for evaluating 
damages to reputation,  
• Although most of the respondents were interested in transferring risks to 
insurance companies, they had concerns about issues such as: lack of formal 
methods for damage assessment, deductibles, covered items, and above all, 
confusing policies.  
 
7.3 Round Two and Summary of the Results 
At the second round we asked the following questions to expand on and to verify the 
responses given in round one: 
 In our first round of interviews with information security experts, we found the 
following as the top 3 important threats to information assets (ranked in order of 
importance): 
1- Theft of proprietary/ disclosure of information 
2- Virus 
3- Denial of service attacks 
 
1- Do you agree with this order? If not, what order do you suggest? 
2- Do you agree that a company may experience these attacks as following: 
Theft of proprietary/ disclosure of information: Rarely to once a year 
Virus: Once every 3 months 
Denial of service: Once a year 
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3- Do you agree with the following control measures for these threats and their 
effectiveness: 
For theft of proprietary/ disclosure of information threats control measures can be listed 
as: 
Perimeter router 
Multiple intrusion detection systems 




Access control  
Virus scanners 
For Denial of Service attacks: 
Access Control  
Firewall 
 Proactive methods such as application software 
If so, what are the effectiveness of these control measures?  What other control 
measure(s) do you suggest for these threats and what do you estimate the effectiveness of 
this control measure? 
All of the respondents agreed with the following ranking of threats in the order of 
importance:  
 1- Theft of proprietary/ disclosure of information 
 2- Virus/worm attacks 
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 3- Denial of service attacks 
One expert said: 
“I agree, number one could be very costly to a business,  
 while two and three can be managed to a degree” 
 
All of the respondents said that frequency of theft of proprietary information, or 
disclosure of information, was estimated to be more than just once a year.  It was also 
stated that under several circumstances most of these attacks did not receive publicity.  
Virus attacks are expected by respondents on a daily basis. 
The following is a sample comment by one expert: 
“I think you are correct in your response, only because this is about how often the 
above incidents are reported.  The first incident is very rarely reported, while the 
second is known due to the publicity that is reported throughout the industry.  As 
to a DoS attack, with better security and equipment, we don't hear from the 
victims as much as we used to.  This may also be due to the fact that Internet 
providers are more proactive in stopping DoS attacks”  
The following control measures were approved as effective control measures: 
For the theft of proprietary/ disclosure of information threat: 
• Perimeter router 
• Multiple intrusion detection systems 
• Access control  
• Firewall 
• System Log 
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 (Encryption, IDS, separation of duties, and web content filtering were also 
suggested by some respondents) 
For virus: 
• Access control 
• Virus scanner 
 (Inline IDS was also recommended) 
For denial of service: 
• Access control 
• Firewall 
• Proactive methods such as application software 
 (Application firewall running alongside the perimeter routers, border routers, and 
bandwidth shapers were also suggested by some respondents) 
The results of the research also indicate that stronger control measures can cause 
dissatisfaction on the part of clients and the maximum response time to a mouse click 
should be les than 25 seconds. 
The following is a sample comment by one expert regarding selecting the 
effective control measures: 
“I agree 100 percent; the stronger the control measures, the more dissatisfied 
the client.  People are very impatient, and their time is very valuable.  Client's 
days are very busy and complicated, and in order to generate a good work 
product, they cannot be frustrated by security controls that have been put in 
place.  Installing complicated security measures, slows down the system, and 
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distracts the client.  As to a reasonable time, I do not know, but we both know 
























Contributions and Conclusions 
 
This research addresses some of the security issues faced by an organization engaged in 
e-commerce as well as some useful information for managers to deal with these issues.  
This research provides the state of the art of information security practice. 
It explains how firms determine where to deploy resources in information security 
and how costs of similar incidents can vary from one company to another.  Therefore, it 
is difficult to “standardize” a procedure or to come up with a single universal model to 
apply in estimating the costs of measures and the damages due to breach of security.  
Governance, policy, architecture, awareness and training, technology, auditing, reporting 
and monitoring, and validation are recommended as a minimal set of elements to be 
considered in an effective information security program.    
The next area of contribution is a comparison of tangible with intangible costs 
reported from information security incidents.  This research, through a comprehensive 
literature review, personal interviews, and case studies, concludes that the impact of an 
information system security incident on an organization, may well be financial, in terms 
of immediate costs and losses; however, long term intangible damages may prove to be 
more serious.  Damage to the brand image, public reputation, goodwill in the market 
place, public and customer confidence in the accuracy of business transactions are some 
examples of intangible damages from disclosure of confidential data.  These intangible 
 90
damages could result in millions of dollars, compared to hundreds of thousands of dollars 
damage from attacks to network services 
The third area of contribution of this research is the adaptation of subjective 
probability assessment to empirical data and applying it to the information security area.  
Acquiring data for information security incidents is difficult because of the negative 
impact of the announcement of a security breach on an organization.  This research 
suggests subjective probability assessment as an alternative. It is suggested to use the 
NIST’s guidelines for ranking threats, to use NSA’s 18 areas of information security 
assessment, and finally to use checklists for vulnerability assessments which can lead an 
organization to estimate probabilities of the occurrences of incidents. 
This research addresses some of the shortcomings of existing classifications of 
threats to information systems and their control measures and considers threats from two 
points of view: 1- Threat agent, and 2- Threat technique.  Threat agent could be 
environmental factors, authorized users, and unauthorized users; threat (penetration) 
technique could be personnel, physical, hardware, software, or procedural.  Providing 
authentication, access control, data confidentiality, data integrity and non-repudiation 
services are presented as control measures to these threats.  
This research developed an overall risk management system for security managers 
to enable them to allocate their resources in the most effective manner and to select the 
most effective control measure.  This system consists of five parts: 1- Resource and 
application value analysis, 2-Vulnerability analysis, 3- Computation of losses due to 
threats and benefits of control measures, 4- Selection of control measures, and 5- 
Evaluation of implementing alternatives.   
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 This research, through a comprehensive literature review, case studies, and 
personal interviews, has identified the order of importance of threats to information 
systems of organizations as follows: 
 1- Theft of proprietary/ disclosure of information 
 2- Virus/worm attacks 
 3- Denial of service attacks 
Respectively, this research identifies perimeter router, multiple intrusion detection 
systems, access control, firewall, and system logs as control measures for the first threat; 
access control and virus scanners for the second threat; and  finally, access control, 
firewall, and proactive methods as effective control measures for denial of service 
attacks. 
This research has developed broader impacts of solving business problems of 
information security by: 
• Making information-related losses public would create the necessary conditions 
for the formation of an economically efficient information security market. These 
conditions currently do NOT exist. 
• Publishing dollar loss information would create clear cost-justification for use of 
effective security solutions. 
• Assisting executives in the private sector and insurance agents in their 
assessments.  Insured losses would create incentives for improvement of 
information security practices and technologies. Furthermore, loss of information 
would provide a monetary unit by which the effectiveness of practices and 
technologies could be measured. 
 92
This research has also developed broader impacts of solving technical problems of 
information security: 
• The financial and legal system is already set up to deal with issues of financial 
liability; but, it is not yet set up to deal with problems of loss and liability.  If 
security problems can be made into financial and legal problems, the financial and 
legal systems can stop imposing artificial and counterproductive constraints on 
the way technology is designed and built. 
• Insuring information security losses, and making information about product 
effectiveness public, will create incentives for technology improvement and 


















One of the objectives of this research is to assist managers in choosing appropriate 
control measures for security threats.  As explained in previous sections, this research 
assigns five control measures to threats to information systems.  Future work would 
involve choosing control measures for each threat.  The level of control measure, (L), 
effectiveness (E), and cost (C) of control measure will also be introduced.  In the 
equations presented in Section 6-2-4, the joint effectiveness of the control measures have 
been considered.   To be practical, real numbers have to be inserted in this control 
measure (L, E, C) variable.  The numbers will be estimated by interviewing security 
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Another area of future research is a tradeoff analysis between the cost of security 
measures-the incident rate-reliability as a measure of safety.  A multi-objective 
optimization approach could be used here to find the Pareto set of solutions.   
Measuring the effectiveness of control measures can be accomplished in a three-
stage process: 
1- A comprehensive list of available control measures, along with information about the 
cost of acquiring, managing, and maintaining each control measure, needs to be 
developed. 
2- For each incident identified, information needs to be collected about which control 
measure was/were in use at the time of the incident, which control measure was 
bypassed, and/or defeated. 
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